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EVIDENCE-EFFECT OF PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUICIDE-Asserting that
the deceased met his death by accidental drowning, appellant sued as beneficiary
to recover under a double indemnity clause of an insurance policy issued to the
deceased by the defendant. The defense was that the deceased committed suicide and that a clause in the policy prevents recovery of double liability under
such circumstances. The jury found for the defendant and, on appeal, the beneficiary contended that the trial judge committed prejudicial error against her by
refusing to instruct the jury that there was a strong presumption against suicide
and in favor of accidental death. Held, the code 1 pro"vides that the presumption
against suicide should be considered by the jury when determining its final
verdict, and failure to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error. New trial
ordered. Three judges dissented. Wycoff v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New
York, (Oregon 1944) 144 P. (2d) 227.
The presumption against suicide appears to have been adopted by the common-law courts in an effort to protect the deceased's family from the ancient

1 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 2-401 declares that a presumption is indirect
evidence; § 2-405 provides that a presumption may be overcome by other evidence;
and § 2-1001 states that the jury "are the judges of the effect or value of evidence."
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harsh laws 2 which provided for the forfeiture to the crown of all the goods and
chattels of a proven suicide.3 The presumption is based on human experience 4
and that experience has proven, as the Iowa court 5 has said that "the instinct of selfpreservation and love o( life is so pervading an element of ~uman nature that the ·
presumption alway~ obtains against self-destruction." 6 Pennsylvania appears to
be the. only state that denies the existence of a presumption against suicide. There
is little disagreement 8 among all other courts as to the effect of the presumption
when the party opposing it either introduces no evidence whatsoever,° or when he
introduces opposing evidence of an overwhelming quality.10 In the first case the
opponent of the presumption loses, in the second he wins, both times by a directed
verdict.11 The conflict in the cases arises in those instances when there can be no
directed verdict for only enough evidence has been offered against the presumption to make an issue of fact which must be determined by the jury. Under such
circumstances, what effect is to be given the presumption against suicide? Some
courts hold, as does the court in the principal case, that the presumption should
be given the eff~ct of evidence, and that the jury should be informed of that
fact.12 Other courts go further and say that the opponent can win only by
I

"The letter of the law borders a little upon severity." 4 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES, Wendell ed., 190 (1854).
8 Id. at I 70. Also see Hartman, ''The Presumption against Suicide as Applied in
Insurance Cases," 19 MARQ. L. REv. 20 (1935), for a discussion of the evolution of the
suicide presumption.
4 Id. at 20. 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 2230, p. 7245 ( I 93 I).
See numerous cases cited.
·
5 Tackm~n v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 1'32 Iowa 64 at 68, 106 N.W.
350 (1906).
6 Id., 132 Iowa at 68.
7 Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 3 I 5 Pa. 497, -I 73 A. 644
( 1934). See id., I 73 A. at 645. This court holds that there is a probability against
suicide, but that it is not strong enough to be a presumption. It points out the vast
number of suicides each year. Also see Hartman, "The Presumption against Suicide
as Applied in Insurance Cases," 19 MARQ. L. REv. 20 (1935), the general theme of
which is, has the suicide presumption outlived its usefulness? Note dicta against the
presumption of suicide in Burkett v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1932) 56 F. (2d)
105. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 232
at 234.
8 Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Matlock, 144 Ark. 126, 221
S. W. 858 (1919) says the presumption still arises even when it is shown that the death
was self-inflicted.
9 The presumption compels the "jury to reach [a cert11in] conclusion· in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent," 9 W1GMORE, EvIDENCE, 3d ed.
§ 2491, p. 289 (1940). Also in THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
CoMMON LAw 314, 315 (1896). See the principal case at 229.
1 ° Kernin v. Citx of Coquille, 143 Ore. 127, 21 P. (2d) 1078 (1933); Hancock
Land Co. v. City of Portland, 82 Ore. 85, 159 P. 969, 161 P. 250 (1916).
11 See notes 9 and 10.
12 Mitchell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 135 Ohio IIO, 1,9 N.E. (2d) 769
(1939); Kruger v. Brown, 79 N. J. L. 418, 75 A. 171 (1910); Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (Iowa, 1943) 7 N.W. (2d) 21; Tackman v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 132 Iowa 46 (1906); O'Brien v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109
2
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introducing sufficient evidence to overcome the weight of that presumption by
a preponderance of the evidence.18 And there are at least two courts.that appear
to hold that the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased committed the crime of suicide.14 The last two considered views, then,
have the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the one relying on ~ presumption to' the opponent. This theory, however, is opposed by a majority of the
courts,15 including the United States Supreme Court,16 which follows the
Thayer-17 Wigmore 18 view regarding presumptions. This theory holds that
the burden of proof should not be shifted from .II to B merely because .II is
relying on a presumption of law rather than upon actual evidence to substantiate
his point. In fact, this theory states that a presumption could not possibly affect
the burden of proof, for it is neither an argument nor evidence, and that the
. primary function of presumptions is a procedural device, which casts "upon
the party against whom they operate, the duty of going forward, in argument of
evidence on the particular point to which they relate." 19 With the introduction
of contrary evidence, according to the Thayer-Wigm0re doctrine, the presumption disappears and only the facts upon which it was based, remain. 20 Under
such circumstances, the majority of the courts hold it is unnecessary and error
to instruct the jury concerning the presumption for it no longer has any probative effect and the only possible effect of an instruction to the contrary would
Kan. 138, 197 P. IIOO (1921); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Watkins,
38 Ohio App. 420, 176 N.E. 469 (1931); Bachmeyer v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Assn., 87 Wis. 325, 58 N.W. 399 {1894). Wisconsin allows the judge to inform the
jury of the presumption, but allows no other instructions permitting the jury to give to
the presumption the weight which it desires. Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, (Neb. 1937) 273 N.W. 478 holds that to instruct the jury as to presumptions is error, but not reversible.
18 Wood v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmet of the World, 166 Iowa 391, 147 N.W.
888 (1914); Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N.W. 808 (1921);
Hoette v. North American Union, (Mo. App. 1916) 187 S.W. 790; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Bentley, (Ga. Ct. App. 1937) 190 S.E. 50; Schrader v. Modern
Brotherhood of America, 90 Neb. 683, 134 N.W. 267 (1912). Eckendork v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 154 La. 183, 97 S. 394 (1923); Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.
(2d) 649 (1935).
14 Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., {Tenn. 1939) 130 S.W. (2d) 85; Provident Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W. (2d) 251 (L935). 8 CoucH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 2230 (1931).
15 Majority opinion of principal case at 230: "most courts have, in the main,
adopted the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine that a presumption of law has no probative or
evidentiary value." Also see 103 A.L. R. 185 (1936) and cases on Pp. 186, 187, 188,
189, 190 and 191.
,
16 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 58 S. Ct. 500 (1938).
17 See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 313
et seq. (1896).
.
18 See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 288 et seq. (1940).
19 See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT CoMMON LAW
314 {1896).
20 See notes 17 and 18. Also Bunnell v. Parelius, 166 Ore. 174, I I I P. (2d) 88
( l 910). When contrary evidence is introduced the presumption, "like a chrysalis, ..•
takes wings and is gone." Id. at 94.
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be to harm the one opposing the presumption.21 However, it has been held by
these same courts 22 that, from the facts w_hich originally gave birth to the now
defunct presumption, an inference against suicide might still arise. And the
judge is allowed to direct the attention of the jury to this inference and instruct
them that they may weigh it against the other evidence in arriving at their verdict. 28 It has been argued that the two views could be reconciled. In the
minority opinion of the principal case it is said that the difference between the
rules is "chiefly one of terminology" 24 and that to the~.layman the difference
between the words "inference" and "presumption" is too subtle to be distinguished. In all probability the "two views lead by different roads to the same
result." 25 The proponents of this line of reasoning agree, however, that the
Thayer-Wigmore view is the better one, for it is less confusing to the jury.
They contend that to ask the, jury to weigh a presumption against the other
evidence is like asking them to "weigh distance against weight or yards against
pounds." 26 The Vermont court 27 was recently swayed by this argument and
overruled a long line of cases in favor of the majority doctrine. The hearty dissent in the principal case and the recent dissent from the established practice in
Galifornia 28 in the Speck v. Sarver case leads one to believe that eventually all
courts will adopt the view of Thayer and Wigmore.
Edwin Boos

See note 15.
See note 15. Also 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd ed., 288 (1940).
-2 3 Id. at 288, 289.
24 Principal case at 239.
25 Id. at 241.
26 Id. at 242.
27 Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 109 Vt. 6, 192 A 184 at 192 (1937).
28 Speck v. Sarver, (Cal. 1942) 128 P. (2d) 16.
21
22

